Note of Proposed Findings

No, it isn’t.  This is not a Note of Proposed Findings; it’s a note about the Note.  I’d better call it the NPF hereinafter.  It’s probably not best to have finished the last sentence with a preposition – if preposition it is – be it never so long but, as I often quote, “the moving finger writes and having writ moves on; nor all your piety nor wit can lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all your tears wash out one word of it” [the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam].

That’s especially true of Arbitral Awards, which is why I have a disinterested friend – in confidence of course – read mine before they are published to the Parties.  But perhaps it is literally true when the keyboard is replaced with a touchscreen.  Did Omar Khayyam anticipate the age of the tablet and smartphone when he wrote the verse?

Be that as it may, the NPF originated in the practice of Scottish arbitration.  When Parties desired to have an arbitration award that could be reviewed by the Court, they could ask for the award to be made in the form of a case stated for consideration.  It was helpful if the arbitrator or arbitrators produced an NPF so that Parties could ask for the award to take that due form.

A useful feature of the NPF was that it enabled a party to correct any mistaken impression of the evidence or argument.  Not that if drafted with care it would allow aspects of the matter to be reheard.

There seems to be no legal reason why an arbitrator should use the NPF more widely in most jurisdictions.  I suggest that it could be especially useful where one Party, perhaps tactically or through lack of understanding, has absented itself from the process and the Arbitrator has been appointed by default.  After all the details the recalcitrant or ill-advised Party will have been given, the NPF will become a final warning that absence will have consequences.

Some may object that an NPF would be giving a recalcitrant Party a second bite of the cherry and that would be unfair to the participating Party.  Arbitration isn’t a Court, however, where he who plays the better game wins.  Of course, in Court a Default Judgment may be overturned if an Appeal is successful.  Arbitration, however, is the product of an agreement in which one implication is that both parties intend the arbitrator or arbitrators to find the right solution to their mutual problem.  The Award, once written, is final, it might as well be carved in stone.  In the premises, what can be wrong with giving that absentee one last chance to say his piece before the die is cast – and the metaphor well and truly mixed?

It’s not a situation with which I have had to deal, but I would expect to consider a reasoned application before permitting the absentee to present evidence and argument.  That evidence and argument would be confined to that needed to deal with the NPF.  The compliant Party would be entitled to a rejoinder before the Award was made.

There is a possibility that a late Counterclaim might arise.  I don’t think that should delay the Award, which could be a Partial Award, final as to the matters with which it deals.  Directions for disposing of the Counterclaim could be added to the Partial Award.  I think that a Dispositive section in the Partial Award could well be so separated that it was clear what had been decided finally and what remains to be settled.

In an International context, I think it might be as well to give directions for settling the late counterclaimed matters in a separate document.  The Partial Award would then be final for the purposes of the New York Convention 1958 [http://www.hartwell.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/ nyc_text.htm] of which Article V.1(e) provides, inter alia, that:

  1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:

. . .

(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.

The first subclause of this provision is the basis for the assertion that an interim decision will not be legally enforced but it should be noted a) that the burden of proof is upon the party against whom recognition and enforcement of an Award is invoked and b) that even then the word “may” suggests that the Court has to be satisfied that its discretion should be exercised.  The curious wording of the Article is worthy of attention.  Scholars argue the distinction between recognition and enforcement, but I think it noteworthy that the Convention uses the singular phrases “it is” and “is sought”, denoting the two as a singular practical concept.

My argument is that, in the context of arbitration – or, for that matter, adjudication or expertise – it remains perfectly proper for the decision-maker to say to the Parties, and particularly any absentee, “On the basis of what you have told me I am minded to find thus and so”, making it clear that his or her mind remains open and flexible.  The NPF is a formal representation of that principle.


On June 25, 2015 there is a talk in the Upper Lecture Theatre of the King’s Inns from 6–7pm on the dispute process known as med/arb. Many law students and practitioners will be familiar with the individual use of mediation or arbitration as an alternative to the court system. Ms Justice Laffoy, of the Supreme Court, chairs the event where Scotland’s leading mediator John Sturrock QC will discuss with well known Irish barrister John Gordon as to the circumstances where allowing for the use of arbitration after an unsuccessful mediation has already occurred may be helpful.
Arran Dowling-Hussey, a friend of mine with whom I share the distinction of being a Consultant with the Kolkata-based legal boutique arbitration specialists, KoVe Global, called my attention to this event, still anticipated at the time of writing.
As a layman, I wondered why lawyers thought the matter in need of study when nothing seemed simpler than for two parties in conflict to say, to a friend, “We have a problem. Would you please be so kind as to help us find an agreement and, if an agreement isn’t possible, please decide the issues for us? We’ll abide by your decision.”

What more was there to say? Well, I don’t suppose the word ‘friend’ would be very welcome to my lawyer colleagues. Although the Commerçants of yore would appeal to one of their own, sometimes but not always a doyen of the trade or profession, to resolve their differences – at the traders in the commodity markets of London still do – the law works very differently. Ignorance is not merely bliss; it’s a prime qualification. Think of the wonderful dicta of London Judges. Folk of a certain age will recall the Judge who asked “Who are the Beatles?” at the very height of their fame.

The Canon Law regarding who may and who may not marry is embodied in a Table of Kindred and Affinity in the Book of Common Prayer. A man may not marry, for example, his wife’s daughter’s daughter; a woman may not marry her father’s mother’s husband. It’s a complex enough list but is as nothing compared with the International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, of 27 pages. The idea of appointing as arbitrator someone you both know and trust horrifies the IBA, as does, by implication, the idea of seeking the judgement someone whom you know to understand your business.

That Justice is blindfolded, everybody knows. Except that she isn’t. There are statues of a blindfolded justice, of course. I haven’t attempted a formal census, but there seem to be as many representations of Justice sighted as there are blindfolded. Sometimes she wields the great sword of state, almost always the symbolic scales that share her name. Symbolic, of course, of Jus, of what is right and true, while the sword symbolises the Imperium, the coercive power, of the State.

Two important examples of statues of a Sighted Justice are the Statue of Peace through Justice at the Peace Palace in The Hague and the Statue of Justice in London atop the dome which caps the Central Criminal Court in Old Bailey. I’ll return to the value of sighted Justice later. For now, I am concerned with those two symbols – the scales, Jus and the sword, Imperium. Together, they represent the decision-making power of the state and its coercive authority. Power and authority that are vested in the Court.

It is not unusual to see it said that arbitration exercises Jus and not Imperium. I’ve said as much myself, but it oversimplifies the matter. Jus is the product of public judicial reasoning and, depending upon the competent jurisdiction, binds all who fall within that jurisdiction. Where the doctrine of stare decisis is observed, it becomes a part of the system; where stare decisis is not the rule, it yet will be persuasive.  Arbitrators have no coercive power and no public authority. An Arbitrator’s Award is merely a statement of what a private person has said should be done, no more and no less. Unlike a decision of the Court the Award binds no-one but the parties. Even the parties are bound only by their own agreement.

Arbitrators have no coercive power and no public authority. An Arbitrator’s Award is merely a statement of what a private person has said should be done, no more and no less. Unlike a decision of the Court the Award binds no-one but the parties. Even the parties are bound only by their own agreement.  Interestingly, because the logical effect of the Award is not a product of the legal process of any state, it has no territorial limits. It is in the same words and says the same things wherever it is taken.

Interestingly, because the logical effect of the Award is not a product of the legal process of any state, it has no territorial limits. It is in the same words and says the same things wherever it is taken.That simple fact is celebrated in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York 1958 (NYC or NYC 1959). This Convention, to which 155 Nations have subscribed at the time of writing, does not alter the Awards, which remain true wherever they are found. What it does

That simple fact is celebrated in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York 1958 (NYC or NYC 1959). This Convention, to which 155 Nations have subscribed at the time of writing, does not alter the Awards, which remain true wherever they are found. What it does is ensure that an arbitration agreement or an arbitral Award will be recognised and, more importantly, that the process for enforcement will be no more onerous than it would be for a domestic Award.This last provision if important because enforcement is the link between the Award and the Law. Often, parties will comply with the Award of their own volition. No Convention, no law is necessary. However,

This last provision is important because enforcement is the link between the Award and the Law. Often, parties will comply with the Award of their own volition. No Convention, no law is necessary. However, most legislation provides that, provided certain essential requirements are met, an Award will be given the authority of a Court judgment and enforced by the Court. Courts will respect the private agreement of the parties as the source of the Award and will not seek to reopen the arbitrator’s fact-finding decision.

The great difficulty of connecting mediation with arbitration is not the inadvertent remark of the neutral during the discussion. Professional care should prevent that. The prime difficulty is the so-called caucus when the mediator moves between the two (not more, please!) consulting them each on a without-prejudice basis.  It is argued that the mediator, having learned privately what the two parties are expecting, hoping, or prepared to achieve, would apply that knowledge if later required to act as arbitrator.

This argument ignores two factors: first that nothing revealed without prejudice can be evidence in the matter; secondly that nothing capable of being evidence may be concealed knowingly.  In addition, modern arbitrators generally have to support their Awards by logical reasons.

I suggest that there is little difficulty if caucusing is not to be attempted; if it is, however, it would be as well to have the written agreement of the parties to the detailed procedure.

Of course, arbitration can be used to settle the entire dispute when mediation has failed. It can also be used in the course of mediation to determine a knotty point – perhaps of law but possibly of fact – to enable the mediation to progress.  Good luck to all my friends in Dublin.

Removal of Arbitrators : Case Note

G.M.Beresford Hartwell

The following two cases, at about the same time, may be useful in considering why the DAC decided to adopt the word “impartial” for the Arbitration Act 1996, in preference to the word “independent”.   They are good examples of an ethical point which has practical implications and which the Court has considered with care.

Bremer GmbH v. ets Soules et Cie and Anthony G Scott [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 160

Disputes arose in connection with Bremer’s sale of US soya bean meal to Soules. The parties opted for arbitration. The arbitrators published their award ordering Bremer to pay Soules $65,129 plus interest. Bremer gave notice of appeal to the GAFTA. A Board of Appeal was subsequently constituted, the members of which included a Mr Anthony Scott. However, Bremer objected to Mr Scott’s appointment and applied to remove him on the ground that: “. . . he is not in a position to act judicially and without any bias, and that accordingly he is guilty of misconduct in the said appeal proceedings.”

Mr Scott was a director of European Grain & Shipping Ltd, a London company which was the wholly-owned subsidiary of Andre et Cie of Lausanne. Bremer alleged that Andre had previously been involved in the unfulfilled transaction as an intermediate trader. This transaction was the subject of the present disputes between Bremer and Soules. Thus, any decision in the Soules arbitration in favour of the Sellers would set a precedent favourable to Andre’s chances in future arbitrations. Accordingly, there was a risk that Mr Scott would lean towards a finding of fact in the Soules arbitration (and those down the string) favourable to the respective buyers. Mustill J held that on the facts and evidence before him, Bremer had totally failed to prove their case. He dismissed the application. In the course of his judgment, Mustill J stated the principles for the removal of arbitrator for misconduct.

Per Mustill J at p. 164: “There are three material situations in which the High Court has power to remove an arbitrator for ‘misconduct’, under section 23 of the Arbitration Act 1950. (1) Where it is proved that the arbitrator suffers from what may be called ‘actual bias’. In this situation, the complaining party satisfies the court that the arbitrator is predisposed to favour one party, or, conversely, to act unfavourably towards him, for reasons peculiar to that party, or to a group of which he is a member. Proof of actual bias entails proof that the arbitrator is in fact incapable of approaching the issues with the impartiality which his office demands. (2) Where the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties, or between the arbitrator and the subject-matter of the dispute, is such as to create an evident risk that the arbitrator has been, or will in the future be, incapable of acting impartially. To establish a case of misconduct in this category, proof of actual bias is unnecessary. The misconduct consists of assuming or remaining in office in circumstances where there is a manifest risk of partiality. This may be called a case of ‘imputed bias’. (3) Where the conduct of the arbitrator is such as to show that, questions of partiality aside, he is, through lack of talent, experience or diligence, incapable of conducting the reference in a manner which the parties are entitled to expect.”


Tracomin SA v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd & George Jacob Bridge [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 586

Tracomin entered into two contracts to buy peanuts from Gibbs, who would ship the goods in monthly instalments. When one shipment was never made, disputes having arisen, were referred to arbitration. Tracomin appointed their arbitrator. Gibbs also appointed theirs — one Mr George Jacob Bridge. Tracomin objected to Mr Bridge’s appointment. They made efforts to persuade Gibbs to replace Mr Bridge with some other arbitrator, but in vain. Pursuant to section 23(1) of the Arbitration Act 1950, Tracomin applied for an order that Mr Bridge be removed, on the ground of imputed bias; that they had been involved with Mr Bridge on three separate arbitrations and that Mr Bridge had not been shown to have acted in an impartial manner.

Per Staughton J at p. 595: “There are, in my judgment, three points of importance to the present case which emerge from the authorities. First, the test is objective, as to what a reasonable man would think; it is not an enquiry into what the party alleging bias thinks, or as to the actual views of the arbitrator who is challenged (Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v. Lannon, [1969] 1 QB 577, Hannam v. Bradford Corporation, [1970] 1 WLR 937, Hagop Ardahalian v. Unifert International SA, [ 1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 84). Secondly, the reasonable man forms his view ‘with no inside knowledge’ (per Lord Justice Cross in Hannam’s case at p. 949). In its context, that statement was directed at inside knowledge of the character of the persons who were accused of bias: see the judgment of Mr Justice Mustill in Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Ets Soules et Cie, [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 160, at p. 168. But the principle must, in my view, be wider than that, since the court looks at appearances, ‘at the impression which would be given to other people’ (per Lord Denning, MR, in the Metropolitan Properties case at p. 599).

While I respectfully agree with Mr Justice Mustill that, in some circumstances, the Court may take into account an innocent explanation of facts which at first sight were suspicious, particularly when the challenge to an arbitrator is made before rather than after he has adjudicated, I do not think that this is always the case. Suppose that a reasonable man would have grounds for believing that the arbitrator was the majority shareholder in one of the parties; I do not see why it should not be established by evidence that the shareholder was not the arbitrator, but another person of the same name, or why the Court should not allow the reasonable man to revise his opinion with the benefit of that knowledge.

By contrast, if an arbitrator is proved to have conferred with one of the parties about the dispute in circumstances which appear improper, I do not think that the reasonable man’s view should be revised by reference to subsequent evidence of what was in fact said. Given that there is a reasonable inference of impropriety in the first place, it would be wrong in my judgment that an application to remove the arbitrator should thereafter fail if the inference is displaced by inside knowledge which was not available to all at the time. Lord Hewart’s famous observation is still the law. I am conscious that there must be a dividing line between the two examples that I have given, and a test to determine on which side of that line a particular case lies. With the greatest respect to what may have been the view of Mr Justice Mustill, I cannot accept that the test is solely whether the application for relief is made before or after the arbitrator has adjudicated.

But wherever else the test is to be found, it need not be determined on this motion: I am convinced that in the present case, so far as it concerns the conduct of Mr Bridge in court during the SOS case, Tracomin SA v. Sudan Oil Seeds Co Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 384 (Mr Bridge was said to have sat beside Counsel for SOS in that case and to have been advising Counsel with visible enthusiasm.), the view of the reasonable man ought not to be revised in the light of subsequent evidence which was not available to an observer at any time. It will be noted that, in considering another of Tracomin’s complaints (the writing of Mr Bridge’s letter to Maitre Wanner) I have paid heed to Mr Bridge’s evidence that he did not know that the letter was going to be used as evidence in Switzerland. But I express no view as to whether it is right to take that evidence into account.

Before leaving that point, I would accept that the reasonable man must have some knowledge of the trade. Mr Justice Mustill held that he must be put in the position of the complainant, having ascribed to him all the complainant’s knowledge and experience of the trade, and the manner in which disputes are habitually resolved, I would be prepared if necessary to go further, and attribute to him all that is common knowledge in the trade even if not known to the complainant. But there is no reason to suppose that the point is of any importance in the present case.

Thirdly, there is some difference of view in the cases as to the precise degree of probability needed to found a charge of imputed bias. In the Metropolitan Properties case Lord Denning, MR (at p. 599) favoured real likelihood of bias, Lord Justice Danckwerts (at p. 602) reasonable doubt as to the chairman’s impartiality. Lord Justice Edmund Davies (at p. 606) rejected real likelihood, and adopted, as a less stringent test, reasonable suspicion of bias. In Hannam’s case Lord Justice Sachs (at pp. 941-942) preferred real danger to real likelihood. In Ardahalian’s case (at p. 89) the Court of Appeal accepted real likelihood; but I do not think that there was any contest as to the standard of probability in that case. Indeed, Lord Justice Ackner referred to the case of R v. Liverpool City Justices ex parte Topping, [1983] 1 WLR 119, where he himself had adopted reasonable suspicion as a test.

In many, if not most cases, it will make no difference which test is applied. That is so in the present case, and I am content to adopt real likelihood, which appears to lay the heaviest burden on the person alleging bias. But I do not, with great respect, share the view of Lord Justice Cross (in Hannam’s case) and Lord Justice Ackner (in the Liverpool City Justices case) that there is little if any difference between the two tests. If it had been necessary to decide the point, I would have followed what was said by Lord Justice Edmund-Davies in the Metropolitan Properties case (1969) 1 QB, at p. 606:

‘With profound respect to those who have propounded the “real likelihood” test, I take the view that the requirement that justice must manifestly be done operates with undiminished force in cases where bias is alleged and that any development of the law which appears to emasculate that requirement should be strongly resisted. That the different tests, even when applied to the same facts, may lead to different results is illustrated by Reg. v. Barnsley Licensing Justices itself, as Devlin LJ made clear in the passage I have quoted. But I cannot bring myself to hold that a decision may properly be allowed to stand even although there is reasonable suspicion of bias on the part of one or more members of the adjudicating body.’

In my judgment a reasonable man, acquainted with the practice at FOSFA, would conclude that there was a real likelihood of bias on the part of Mr Bridge from the appearance of his conduct during the hearing of the 505 case in this court. That impression would not be dispelled, but rather slightly fortified, by the letter to Maitre Wanner, the reference to taking instructions from his principals, and the two occasions on which application was made to remove him. But it is on the appearance of Mr Bridge’s conduct during the SOS case in this Court that my conclusion is founded. Accordingly, I am prepared to make the order sought.” [The parties later came to terms. No order was made because Mr Bridge agreed to resign.]

 as first posted to http://www.nadr.co.uk/ by GMBH

A Paradox of Arbitration

“A paradox, a paradox, a most ingenious paradox!”

(The Pirates of Penzance or the Slave of Duty – Gilbert & Sullivan, Doyly Carte 1911)

Arbitration is not legal but it is legitimate.

In a note, reported by Conventus Law Singapore – The Approach To Scrutiny Of Arbitral Awards , of 7 January, 2015 by Prakash Pillai, a Partner of Clyde & Co, he opens by saying “International arbitration must, out of necessity, rely on the courts to uphold and enforce arbitral awards and to support the arbitral process.”  The article goes on to quote the words of Professor Jan Paulsson, perhaps one of the greatest of les haûts arbitres:  “the great paradox of arbitration is that it seeks the cooperation of the very public authorities from which it wants to free itself.[1]

With sincere respect (I am an Engineer and thus must choose my words carefully), no and no again.

International arbitration only relies on the courts in the sense that all agreement must resort to the courts when one or other parity fails to comply with his or her bargain.  There is no paradox.  Arbitration itself is a private process, no more and no less than the transient effect of an agreement between two persons.  It has no existence of its own.  If it has an identifiable intent or desire, it is simply a manifestation of the will of the Parties.  If arbitration can be said to seek cooperation from anyone it looks no further than the Parties, its creators, expecting them, as I have said, to comply with their bargain and honour the Award.

I know of course that there are arbitral institutions who seek a relationship with the courts.  Some, indeed, use the name “Court[2]” to aggrandise themselves as if they had a Sovereign’s authority.  Some may have the backing of the relevant state.  Nevertheless, the only authority they have, except perhaps in China[3] is the authority conferred by the parties themselves.

Of itself, the Award is no more than a statement by the private arbitrator(s) of what the parties ought to do and, by their arbitration agreement (often, of course, a clause in a wider contract, although it survives the contract itself) have agreed to do.  Although, logically, it differs not at all from any other contractual bargain, various legislatures have elected to simplify the application of the Award within the Context of the Court, provided certain more or less obvious procedural requirements have been met by the arbitrator(s).  In English law, for example, the arbitrator(s) have statutory duties to:

(a)act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and

(b)adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined.[4]

I argue that there is nothing in the relationship between the Courts and the simple process of private decision making that is any more paradoxical than the relationship between the Courts and any other form of binding agreement, such as a construction contract.  Certainly there is nothing about arbitration that seeks to free itself from the appropriate law.  That would be illegal and while arbitration is not legal, it is certainly neither illegal nor antipathetic to the legal systems that it assists and within which it operates.

That arbitration seeks to competes in some way with the legitimate power of the Sovereign within whose jurisdiction it is conducted or, indeed, in any place where a Party may wish the New York Convention 1958 to be upheld is a canard I sought to expose – seemingly without success – in my article: “Arbitration and the Sovereign Power[5] in The Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 17 No. 2, April 2000, published by Kluwer Law International.

[1]      1 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration in Three Dimensions, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 2/2010 (January 13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536093 accessed Wednesday, 07 January 2015.

[2]      The word “Court” need not mean more than  an enclosed area, a yard, see the OED online entry at   http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/43198?rskey=0iMwaP&result=1#eid.  Accessed  Wednesday, 07 January 2015.   The meaning, “A court of judicature, of law, or of administration” is number IV in the etymological list.

[3]      Under Chinese law, arbitration is not enforced unless it is conducted through an authorised body.  I don’t know if private arbitration is permitted.

[4]      S.33(1), Arbitration Act 1996.  Note the use of the words “fairly” and “fair” in the same sentence.

[5]      http://www.hartwell.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/Arbitration_Power.htm accessed Wednesday, 07 January 2015


Lawyers understandably regard the Rule of Law as the Rule of The Law, that is to say the The Law of their nation states or an international consensus – insofar as can be achieved – derived from those states or bodies, such as the ICJ, created by them.

The word “Arbitration” means different things to different folks.  In history there has been various English legislation, of which the Arbitration Act 1996 is but the latest example of a series that may have begun with that of 1698 that followed the report of John Locke a year or two earlier.

The distinguishing feature of those Acts was that they said to disputants, in effect: “You may settle your disputes yourselves and come to the Court only as a last resort.”  Indeed, the current statute speaks in terms: “the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense; the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest;” and notably, “in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.”

The Act then makes it clear that the so-called tribunal is no more and no less than an extension of the parties themselves.  There are agencies, the ICC arbitration facility is one such, which exist to provide a commercial service.  That service includes administration and the use of a set of rules but, crucially the parties retain the ability to select their arbitrators (save in certain circumstances) and even the presiding arbitrator – often selected by the other two.

That is the arbitration contemplated by the lexicographers of OED when they wrote the definition: “The settlement of a dispute or question at issue by one to whom the conflicting parties agree to refer their claims in order to obtain an equitable decision.”

There is a difference between the arbitration I have considered so far and the arbitration beloved of my lawyer friends.  Their approach seems to appeal to authority, not the Judges but the arbitrations arranged, shall I say authoritatively.  The thread seems to run through the argument.  John Mortimer, in the context of his Rumpole stories named it as the golden thread of The Law.  The Law of states because what other Law can there be?

Now isn’t the time to seek an answer to that question.  Aristotle seems to have come close to it but I won’t try lest, like Icarus, I fall.

Sadly, there seems to be a difference that cannot be resolved.  Laymen (and those who drafted the legislation, in England and elsewhere – vide the UNCITRAL Model Law) expect the arbitrators to be their peers (as still they are, e.g. in trade associations).  Lawyers expect to clothe arbitrators with authority, even if it only a notional authority.

I have come to the conclusion, reluctantly, that the debate, if it is still a live debate cannot be resolved.  There is a street in the ancient city of Chester, where the upper stories of the houses overhang the pavement so that the occupants can converse from one side of the street to another.  Sadly, we like they, will never resolve our difference while we argue from different premises.

Perhaps, if we can think of an arbitrator – but of which kind?

They Wanted to Close Her Chapter

A Mediator’s Dilemma

John is a book dealer who is also an experienced mediator.

Pauline has worked for a few years for Big Red Books as a sales agent with a West Coast territory. Mal Lupus is the new Sales Director of Big Red and wants to conduct future sales through a Website he has commissioned recently. He decides to terminate Pauline’s Contract –it has three years to run – and approaches John to mediate the termination settlement. Pauline agrees.

At the open mediation session, Mal says that he is sorry Pauline is losing her income but the advance of the Internet makes the Area Sales Agent a thing of the past and Big Red can’t afford them anymore. Three month’s salary is all he can offer with no compensation for lost commission. He needs her to sigh a “No Competition” agreement for the next five years.

In caucus, Pauline tells John that she feels that she has nothing to bargain with and asks him if he will try to see of Mal will improve his offer.

In Big Red’s caucus room, Mal explains to John that he is prepared to extend the payment to four months but he insists on the “No Competition” agreement because, he says, Gabriel White of Little Blue Books has already approached him and asked if he will part with Pauline. He wants her to launch a new range. He will pay her more with a similar rate of commission. Mal is worried about that competition. He says he is telling John in confidence to explain why Pauline’s signature is so necessary.

What should John do? He doesn’t have long.

Fees of Experts – Who pays?

I couldn’t find this extract by searching through the usual sources, so I thought it might be handy to put it here.  I have no idea whether or not it remains good law (the old White Book has been superseded by CPR – this is all about England and Wales) but is seems worth an airing!

Note to s.67, Solicitors Act 1974

Extract from The Supreme Court Practice 1982 at [3071] p.851.

As far as the fees of expert witnesses are concerned, in the case of Re Leighton (Solicitor), Young v Leighton, in Chambers, 1969 unreported, Mocatta J. called on the Taxing Masters for a certificate as to the practice. This was given in the following terms:

To the Hon Mr Justice Mocatta

In compliance with your Lordship’s direction the Taxing Masters of the Supreme Court Taxing Office beg respectfully to certify as follows:

  1. It is within our knowledge that solicitors who engage the services of a professional witness, or who call such a witness to give evidence on behalf of a client are personally liable as a matter of professional etiquette to discharge that witness’s fees, whether or not they have expressly or impliedly contracted to do so. It is settled practice for solicitors to pay such fees, which are treated as a professional disbursement as between solicitor and client in a solicitor and client bill of costs.
  2. Such disbursements are habitually treated upon taxation of such a bill as an item properly so introduced.

Dated November 21, 1969 Signed . . . . . . . . . .

Judgment was given in accordance with the terms of the certificate.